Introduction
This paper will seek to answer two questions: first how far have the recent 3 rd wave transitions to democracy enhanced women's substantive representation in the post transition period? And second are there any comparative lessons that can be drawn from analysing these experiences? I use a relatively broad definition of the substantive representation of women (SRW) that encompasses not just the extent to which women legislative representatives 'act for' women but also includes the involvement of women and women's concerns in policymaking (Mackay 2004) . Obviously this raises contentious issues. The wider debate about whether there is such as thing as women's interests that all women share has been a longstanding one. Rather than enter this difficult terrain, I will use the extent to which actors and outcomes are attempting to improve levels of gender equality as my marker.
The empirical material is drawn from a larger study of eight transitions to democracy that took place just prior to the peak of the '3 rd wave' in the mid 1990s (Waylen 2007) . All are recognised to have made a transition to some form of democracy, however imperfect.
The study looks at a relatively long period of between twenty to thirty years for each case. This timespan encompasses the non democratic regime and its breakdown, the transition and the first decade or so after the founding election. This extensive time period allows us to make some judgements not only about outcomes but also about the processes from which these outcomes emerged. The case studies include transitions from authoritarianism (Brazil, Chile, Argentina, El Salvador and South Africa) and state socialism (Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic). The transitions took different forms -some were relatively quick (Argentina and Czechoslovakia) and others were relatively drawn out and negotiated (Brazil, South Africa, El Salvador and Chile) with different legacies.
The case studies also display a range of different gender outcomes. Women's descriptive representation varies considerably. Although initially low in all cases except South Africa, in 2005 it ranged from less than 10% in Brazil and Hungary, to over 30% in South Africa and Argentina with all the other cases somewhere in between. The SRW of women within legislatures has also varies considerably between the cases. As we will see the extent to which women legislators acted for women -whether in terms of cross party organizing or their interaction with organized women outside the legislature -demonstrates huge variety. Turning to examine SRW in policymaking processes we will again see big differences. Although women's policy agencies (WPAs) have been established in all the countries, the policy access and effectiveness of these institutions is not uniform and indeed has varied over time within cases. Policy outcomes too are not uniform. In a couple of cases, namely Brazil and South Africa, pioneering gender sensitive constitutions were enacted as part of the transition. Policy change has also been easier to achieve in some contexts and some gender issue areas, such as divorce and property rights, than in others such as reproductive rights. An extension of reproductive rights was only achieved in one case (South Africa) and retrenchment has been more frequent (Poland and El Salvador) .
How can we explain these different outcomes? Why is that the SRW appears to have been enhanced in the aftermath of some transitions but this has not happened across the board. These outcomes are not arbitrary and some causal patterns can be discerned. But any analysis that seeks to understand the circumstances under which the SRW can be enhanced in a transition to democracy has to look at a number of factors. First it has to consider the nature of women's organizing at different stages of the transition. This can play an essential role, but on its own women's mobilization is no guarantee of success.
Other factors -a favourable political opportunity structure and strategic organizing by key actors -are also crucial. To examine the political opportunity structure in the context of transitions we need to look at the institutional legacy of the non democratic regime, the gendered nature of institutions including political parties and party and electoral systems as well as the international context at different stages in processes of transition. Finally I would argue that analysing the activities of a range of key actorswhether they are feminists or allies within legislatures, governments, parties or within women's organizations -and the extent to which they form alliances, and strategically frame issues -is essential. It is then possible to understand why, in some contexts, it was possible not only to articulate certain gender issues, but also place them on the political agenda and achieve some degree of policy change.
Our final task is to consider the wider implications of this analysis of transitions to democracy. In the conclusion we will not only reflect on the key conditions for enhancing the SRW in transitions to democracy but also consider how far these findings are generalizable. Are transitions very particular times of political change that offer unique opportunities -for example framing the arguments for quotas in terms of enhancing or consolidating the transition -or can similar conditions and findings relevant to the establishment of new institutions occur in other contexts?
The first section of the paper will examine the electoral arena and the activities of women legislators. When assessing the extent to which women legislators 'act for' other women, I will follow Franceschet's (2006) women therefore uses a concept of representation that sees it as an interaction between representatives and the represented. The second and third sections examine SRW in the bureaucratic and policymaking arenas. This will involve more than looking just at the WPAs that have so often been the focus of attention but also at the extent to which a range of women are incorporated into policymaking processes. I will do this by examining one gender issue area. I do not consider the implementation of policy outcomes, but I do realise that so often implementation falls short of expectations.
However I would argue that putting legal rights and policies in place can subsequently enable women to contest their lack of implementation and provide the opportunity to try to translate paper rights into lived rights.
How far do women legislative representatives 'act for' women in post transition polities?
We have already noted the big variation in levels of women legislators elected in the case studies in the post transition period. But there are no discernible differences in levels that result from transitions from authoritarianism or state socialism (except those that result from a greater propensity to adopt quotas). Some ex state socialist countries have relatively high levels of women's representation (eg Poland, the Czech Republic) while others have very low levels (eg Hungary). The same range is evident in ex authoritarian polities. Brazil has had consistently low levels while others (Argentina and South Africa) have had high levels.
While there is no direct evidence that higher numbers of women representatives (a 'critical mass') will necessarily enhance the SRW in post transition politics, it is useful to reflect on some of the explanations for these variations as their causes also have some impact on the actions of women legislators. However there is some evidence to support the contention that a number of patterns in these post transition polities do replicate trends seen in longer-standing democracies.
Electoral systems do seem to make a difference. PR systems tend to have higher levels of women's representation than first past the post systems but the data are not conclusive. Different kinds of parties also display differences in the number of women legislators. On the whole parties on the left have higher proportions of women legislators whether they are communist successor parties (as in ex state socialist polities), ex revolutionary parties (in South Africa or El Salvador) or more typical left wing parties (Chile). But some left-wing parties, such as the PT in Brazil, have at times had surprisingly low levels (which could perhaps be the demonstration effect in reverse in a context where other parties also have low levels). However some right-wing and populist parties also display quite high levels of female representation.
There are, however, some trends that do seem to result from the prevalence of less institutionalized parties and party systems that are more common in post transition polities. The relatively high levels of electoral volatility in cases, such as in Poland, can help to account for the relatively big swings in levels of female representation seen from election to election (including the electoral emergence and demise of a women's party, WOR in Russia, from one election to the next). Less institutionalised parties also demonstrate a bigger range of outcomes in terms of levels of female representatives.
Some have relatively high levels of female representation as mechanisms around candidate selection can be very variable and party elites often exercise great influence.
Indeed it has been suggested that, to maintain their control over selection procedures, party elites in some post transition polities have been prepared to accept party quotas as a way of fending off demands for greater party democracy in the form of primaries.
There is some evidence from Russia that in an inchoate party system that has high levels of independent candidates winning elections, women find it more difficult to get elected as they often lack funds and connections.
How do these patterns of women's descriptive representation impact on the actions of women legislators? Putting aside the arguments about 'critical mass' and the extent to which the presence of more women legislators change the culture of legislatures and can encourage other women to vote and stand for office, we will focus on the extent to which women legislators 'act for' women and organize around gender issues in legislatures. We can do this by first focusing quite narrowly on women legislators' organizing across party lines and within parties inside legislatures before broadening out to examine the links with organized women outside legislatures around gender issues.
Within our case study countries we see a range of different types of cross party organizing among female legislators. A number of factors seem to affect its incidence and form, namely whether it is organizing on an issue-by-issue basis or into a more formal women legislators' block or grouping. First the character of the party system and the strength of party discipline are key factors. Women's cross party organizing can be easier in contexts where parties systems are fractured and party discipline is weakcharacteristics commonly associated with post transition polities. A bancada femenina has therefore been possible in Brazil, facilitated by low party discipline and a multiplicity of parties, in ways that proved problematic in cases characterised by higher levels of party discipline such as is found in both South Africa and Poland. A Women's Parliamentary Group (WPG) was founded in 1991 in Poland. Women of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) which included reformed communists and the more right-wing Democratic Union were the most active within it. The WPG campaigned around issues of family welfare, divorce and abortion law reform within parliament as well as trying to set up links with wider networks of women outside of parliament. However Siemienska (1998: 142) reports that when the WPG developed a joint position on an issue, problems with agreeing strategy and tactics often followed. Over time the WPG became increasingly dominated by women from the SLD as disputes between different parties increased. The impact of relatively strong party discipline can also be discerned in South Africa.
Attempts to set up a multi-party women's caucus, the WPG, early on in the South African parliament were not very successful. The WPG did not have the support of the minority parties -the leadership of the National Party was opposed to it and it was seen as an ANC front (Geisler 2000: 622) . Racial, class and ideological divisions have been seen as more salient for women legislators than any unity gained through shared interests in South Africa.
But there is evidence that organizing among women legislators has often been more There is a suggestion in the South African case that the second intake of women MPs were more professional in background with fewer links to grassroots movements than many of the previous intake. Therefore a range of factors, both within and outside the electoral arena, help to determine how far women legislators will 'act for' women. But in any study of SRW the electoral arena cannot be examined in isolation from the bureaucratic, constitutional and legal arenas as equally important areas where the SRW can be enhanced.
Women's Policy Agencies in post transition polities
WPAs have been one key area where attempts have been made to enhance the SRW in policymaking. The creation of WPAs often coincided with a move from a nondemocratic regime to a more competitive electoral system. It was facilitated by the increasingly favourable international context in the 1990s manifested in the preparations for the Beijing conference and its aftermath, and for countries in East Central Europe, by EU accession. But despite these overall trends, WPAs were often set up for very different reasons, with different structures, powers and resources and therefore with different capacities to represent 'women's interests' in the policymaking process. Some therefore had 'insider' and others 'symbolic' roles (Lovenduski 2005) . In order to understand the extent that WPAs have enhanced the SRW in transitions to democracy, it is useful to assess their utility and effectiveness as well as their ability to give different groups of women 'policy influence and access'. To do this we need to examine how and why they were set up; the resources they were allocated; their accountability and the participation of groups outside the state; as well as the impact of the wider political context within which WPAs have been operating.
The WPAs in our case study countries vary hugely. In three countries, they were set up directly as a result of the efforts of organized women during the process of transition.
Sympathetic elected governments in Brazil, Chile and South Africa established a women's policy machinery relatively early on, largely as a consequence of campaigning by women activists within political parties, legislative bodies and women's organizations.
They had placed the establishment of a state women's machinery on the agenda of these transitions and forced its acceptance by influential political parties. In South Africa a 'package' of institutions in the form of the 'strategic nodes' envisaged by feminists were set up within the government, legislature and civil society together with an independent statutory body in an attempt to avoid the problems frequently seen elsewhere (Albertyn 1995 (Schild 1998) . At the same time, the post transition demobilization of many women's movements has also undermined the legitimacy of WPAs within the state, as the strength of the outside constituencies that WPAs could claim to represent bolstered their power.
The responsibility that the WPA has for distributing funds for research and projects to NGOs and women's organizations that might previously have gone to them directly under the non democratic regime, can often result in a clientelistic relationships with women's organizations with some groups more likely to benefit than others (Waylen 2000) . Indeed it is often claimed that it is the most professionalized organizations which get the funding as they can fill out the forms and know their way around the system more effectively. As a result grassroots and popular organizations lose out to the more middle class, often feminist, NGOized ones that provide the 'gender-policy assessment, project execution and social services delivery' that the state and within that WPAs want (Alvarez 1999: 182) . As Franceschet (2005) 
The policymaking process in post transition polities: Domestic Violence
To bring together the analysis of the bureaucratic and electoral arenas, the final part of this paper will consider the policymaking process in one area of gender rights. Gender rights are not one homogenous category but vary considerably. Policy change has been easier to achieve in some areas of gender rights than others and different issues engender different levels of opposition from counter-movements -particularly from the Catholic Church which itself had varying levels of influence and legitimacy in different post transition polities (Htun 2003) . Abortion reform has therefore proved very divisive in many post transition polities whereas changes to property and marital law, was, with the exception of Chile, much less so. I have chosen to focus on one area, domestic violence, which while it has been very important for feminists, has also not been as controversial as reproductive rights particularly abortion.
In post transition polities, efforts to change laws and policies around domestic violence have varied considerably in both their extent and effectiveness. Although reliable figures about the incidence of domestic violence are notoriously difficult to collect, it is recognized that levels are high in all the countries in this study. Under state socialism, domestic violence was not recognized as a problem, but came into the open after its collapse, making it hard to assess how far the incidence has increased or whether there is just more acknowledgement of pre-existing levels. The incidence of domestic violence is also very high in South Africa and our Latin American case studies..
Primarily as a result of women's organizing at the national, regional and global level, the international climate towards domestic violence, and violence against women more generally has altered considerably since the 1970s. Women's movements' campaigns to get gender based violence on the international agenda began in the 1970s, and as a result of patient lobbying of national governments and strategizing at international conferences, an opening was created in the 1980s. Women's rights were explicitly recognized as human rights at the Vienna Conference in 1993 and the use of a human rights framework to create a new international consensus expanded the possibilities for debates about domestic violence and the responsibility of the state to try to eliminate it in the 1990s (Friedman 2006) . In Latin America this organizing also took on a regional dimension with the formation of networks such as CLADEM and, as a result, the OAS adopted a convention that surpassed the UN one in 1994. Most national legislation on domestic violence was also passed around the time of the Vienna Conference and the Beijing women's conference when the international climate was at its most favourable (Macaulay 2000) .
However there are marked differences in the extent to which post transition governments adopted anti-domestic violence legislation and implemented policies to prevent and ameliorate the effects of domestic violence. By 2003 five of our case study countries: Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Peru and South Africa had adopted specific legislation on domestic violence and Brazil had legislation in the pipeline. But none of our case study countries from East Central Europe had done so. How can we explain this marked difference between East Central Europe and other transition countries? If we look first at our Latin American examples and then consider the South African case,
we can see that the context was very different to East Central Europe. Women organizing during the Latin American and South African transitions had formed part of a democratic opposition that campaigned for transitions to democracy that would put an end to state violence and human rights abuses and substitute meaningful citizenship with full civil and political rights for everyone. These actions facilitated making the connection between women's rights and human rights. Using a human rights framework was therefore a powerful tactic allowing feminists to argue that domestic violence could not be separated from human rights abuses and the violence of the military (Friedman 2006 ).
Outcomes in individual countries have therefore to be seen in this broader context. In Brazil, feminists had been campaigning about domestic violence since 1975 and had played a key role in the international networks that were active around gender rights (Pitanguy 2003: 817) . The 1988 Brazilian constitution incorporated many women's demands, including, almost uniquely in Latin America, a provision on domestic violence.
According to Pitanguy (2003: 818) this made family violence a state responsibility and potentially it could be held accountable for failing to do anything to prevent domestic violence. Around that time a number of other initiatives such as women's police stations took place at both the federal and state levels. But the picture is also mixed.
Developments at the federal level -such as the weakening of the WPA in the early 1990s, the lack of dedicated resources or the necessary complementary legal changes to make domestic violence a crime in its own right -reduced the capacity for significant change.
Implementation therefore largely depended on individual states and could vary with changing circumstance. Gains were achieved, building on the long-standing activities of women's organizations and the WPA, but they were still vulnerable to budget cuts and changes in the political climate.
Chile is less well known than Brazil for its efforts in the area of domestic violence.
However the passage of the bill on Intra Family Violence that became law in 1994 was significant for a number of reasons. Even though it was not framed in those terms, it was the first successful piece of women's rights legislation and the organizing around it relatively cohesive alliances of actors, both insiders and outsiders, using international and regional norms and frameworks and sometimes framing legislation in terms of strengthening the family, to achieve reforms.
Conclusions
This paper has explored the extent to which recent 'third wave' transitions to democracy have enhanced the SRW in the post transition period. A number of factors explain the variations that we encountered. In the electoral arena, sheer numbers does not seem to be sufficient for female legislators to 'act for' women. parties that are sympathetic to gender equality are important, otherwise tokenism is a danger -and as a result any body will be under-funded and understaffed -a criticism which has been levelled even at relatively sympathetic governments such as South Africa (Goetz 1997 To bring our previous discussions of the electoral and bureaucratic arenas together, we also considered policy processes in one important area of gender rights. This allowed us to examine the broader conditions that are necessary to achieve gender policy change,
showing how women can influence policymaking in practice. Change was more likely where there was: a history of women's activism; alliances between activists both outside and inside the government and state that used the opportunities of the transition; and a favourable national and international environment. These could all combine to achieve policy change that was not possible under the previous non democratic regime. In some cases the policy environment was relatively open, facilitated by an enabling framework such as a constitution as well as institutions such as WPAs and some signifcant policy changes did ensue.
What general lessons can we draw? Our discussions of the conditions that facilitate any enhancement of the SRW in transitions to democracy highlighted the importance of a number of factors: the broader political context, the role of key actors, particularly feminists, in a range of locations; as well as the potential importance of alliances of different groups of women including women's organizations. It is clear from our analysis of the electoral, bureaucratic and legal arenas that alliances between different women, both insiders and outsiders, have been easier to forge in some areas and issuespolitical rights, divorce and even domestic violence -than on others such as abortion.
The cohesiveness of women's movements as well as the priority that they gave also varied considerably between issues. Some issues can also be framed in ways that do not conventions and the strength of religious/right-wing opposition to gender rights -is more significant for new democracies undergoing an important period of political change than long-standing ones. But although some of our findings are more relevant to the analysis of post transition polities, our conclusions also give us a number of more general insights about the key traits needed to achieve an enhancement in the SRW. As such I am confident that they resonate with the key factors that are being explored by scholars looking at established liberal democracies.
